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Abstract. Necessary and sufficient conditions for choice functions to be rational
have been intensively studied in the past. However, in these attempts, a choice
function is completely specified. That is, given any subset of options, called an
issue, the best option over that issue is always known, whilst in real-world scenar-
ios, it is very often that only a few choices are known instead of all. In this paper,
we study partial choice functions and investigate necessary and sufficient ratio-
nality conditions for situations where only a few choices are known. We prove
that our necessary and sufficient condition for partial choice functions boils down
to the necessary and sufficient conditions for complete choice functions proposed
in the literature. Choice functions have been instrumental in belief revision theory.
That is, in most approaches to belief revision, the problem studied can simply be
described as the choice of possible worlds compatible with the input information,
given an agent’s prior belief state. The main effort has been to devise strategies
in order to infer the agents revised belief state. Our study considers the converse
problem: given a collection of input information items and their corresponding
revision results (as provided by an agent), does there exist a rational revision
operation used by the agent and a consistent belief state that may explain the
observed results?
1 Introduction
Choice functions are commonly used in economic and social sciences to describe the
process following which, faced with a ranking problem, an individual makes choices by
selecting a few outcomes in each subset of possible outcomes (such a subset is called an
issue); the selected outcomes are those to which no other outcomes can be strictly more
preferred according to its preference. These observable choices testify of a non-directly
observable preference relation. There has been a considerable amount of study about
the definition of optimal choices under different types of preference relations (e.g., [2]).
Equally interesting is the converse problem described as: given a choice function, that
is, an abstract mapping that selects some desirable outcomes for each issue [20], does
there exist an underlying rational preference relation from which this choice function
can be derived? Several solutions to this problem exist for a long time, for instance [9,
20, 23]. However, in these attempts, the choice functions are full-fledged mappings that
provide every issue with a set of mapped outcomes. In real-world scenarios, it is very
often that choices of only a few issues are known, instead of choices over all the issues.
Actually it is natural that given the whole set of issues, only a subset of them may have
been exposed to the agent and hence the agent can only provide a limited response to the
issues. Therefore, it is interesting to study conditions ensuring the existence of a rational
preference that can reflect these choices. In this paper, we define the concept of partial
choice functions and investigate their necessary and sufficient conditions for scenarios
where only a few choices are known. We also examine the relationships between partial
and (complete) choice functions and between their necessary and sufficient conditions.
Interestingly, our study and investigation result can be applied to study the con-
verse belief revision problem. Belief revision [1, 16, 10, 13] performs belief change on
an agent’s beliefs when new evidence is received. In classical belief revision, it is a
default assumption that there is a clear and consistent belief structure (e.g., a total pre-
order over possible worlds, the most plausible possible worlds of which generate the
belief set) embedded in an agent’s mind, based on which this agent performs revision
upon receiving new information. Here, we consider the converse of this problem. That
is, if there are several revision scenarios, each of which consisting of a piece of new
information and its corresponding revision result (represented as pairs (i; i) subse-
quently), then does there exist a rational belief structure from which these revision
scenarios proceed. In other words, for each input i, does the agent exhibit the exis-
tence of a belief structure where i is exactly the revision result based on i in scenario
(i; i)? Figures 1 and 2 provide intuitive illustration of the difference between classic
belief revision and its converse problem. That is, in classic belief revision, given an
agent’s a priori belief state and a newly received piece of information, appropriate revi-
sion strategies (operators) are designed to revise the agent’s belief set and derive a new
one. Whilst the converse problem is: given a set of revision scenarios (pairs of evidence
and revision result), does the agent exhibit the existence of a consistent prior epistemic
state justifying these revision results? Here by epistemic state, we mean the ranking of
possible worlds, hence the corresponding prior belief set.
Belief revision1 always respects the Success postulate such that the revision result
(i) should respect the new information (i). Semantically, the models of the revision
result should be a subset of the models of the formula representing the new information
(i.e.,Mod(i) Mod(i)). Therefore, the converse belief revision problem reduces to
what we have discussed above on inducing a preference relation for choices. Actually,
belief revision theory has borrowed material from choice function theory via axioms 7
and 8 of the AGM framework. This does not come as a surprise. An extensive discussion
of the relationships between choice function axioms and properties of non-monotonic
consequences, a topic closely related to belief revision, can be found in [18, 17, 22].
These papers also include an extensive bibliography on that topic. The last two AGM
axioms are in fact not characteristic of the revision problem and one may argue that, by
means of the two axioms, the AGM approach chooses as much an uncertainty frame-
work that is not probabilistic by means of such two axioms as it provides core axioms
for belief revision (the first six).
1 Here we do not consider non-prioritized belief revision which can be seen as belief merging.
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Fig. 1. Classic Belief Revision
Fig. 2. Reversed Belief Revision
Note that the converse belief revision problem discussed here is different from the
converse problem of iterated belief revision addressed in [8] and the converse belief
revision in multi-agent systems [5]. Here, the multiple revision scenarios do not cor-
respond to a sequence of revision actions, where the iteration may cause successive
changes of an agent’s belief structure. Instead, here we assume a given agent’s belief
structure, to which every new piece of information is applied separately so as to derive
a different new belief state. This is in line with the view of belief revision as defeasible
inference discussed in [12, 14], one of the three kinds of belief revision perspectives.
Below, we first provide some preliminaries on propositional logics and choice func-
tions in Section 2. In Section 3, we define the notion of partial choice function and
propose a necessary and sufficient condition for a partial choice function to be ratio-
nal. We then compare our solution with related works in Section 4, showing that our
condition can recover the conditions proposed in the literature. In Sections 5, we show
how this condition can be used to solve the converse belief revision problem. Finally,
in Section 6, we conclude the paper.
2 Preliminaries
Logic:We consider a propositional languageL defined in a usual sense.We useMod()
to denote the set of models for . We write  j=  iffMod() Mod(). For a set A,
form(A) denotes a formula whose set of models is A. That is,Mod(form(A)) = A.
Choice Functions: Let X denote the finite set of all conceivable outcomes, and
P(X) represent the family of all non-empty subsets of X . Each A 2 P(X) is called
an issue (or agenda) and let R denote a complete and reflexive binary relation defined
on X . R is a total pre-order if it is transitive, i.e., xRy; yRz implies xRz for any
x; y; z 2 X .
3
LetM(A;R) denote the set of maximal elements (choices) in A such that:
M(A;R) = fxjx 2 A and xRy;8y 2 Ag:
A choice function is a mapping F : P(X) ! P(X) satisfying: 8A 2 P(X), F(A) 
A. A choice function F is said to be rational, if there is a total preorder R such that for
all A 2 P(X);F(A) = M(A;R).
Elements x and y are called indifferent in terms of R, denoted x R y, if both xRy
and yRx hold.
3 Rational Partial Choice Functions
IfF is a mapping from P(X)! P(X), then for any issueA  X , we know the choice
F(A) over A. But in real-world applications, usually we only know choices over a few
issues. For instance, if we view a country as the set of its cities, then for a familiar
country, we can tell our choices on preferred cities, while for unfamiliar countries, we
cannot. Formally, we define the notion of a partial choice function.
Definition 1 Let 
 be a subset of P(X), a partial choice function F over 
 is a map-
ping: 
 ! P(X) satisfying: 8A 2 
, F(A)  A.
Here 
 denotes the set of issues whose maximal elements are known. Note that in [6],
although it is not explicitly defined, the choice frame proposed does contain a partial
choice function.
Let
S

 =
S
A2
 A denote the union of all sets in
. Similarly, we denote a partial
choice function F over 
 is rational2 if there is a total pre-order R overS
 such that
for allA 2 
;F(A) = M(A;R). Obviously, if
 = P(X), then our definition reduces
to the standard definition.
Note that a total pre-order R over
S

 can be easily extended to X such that: for
any w;w0 62 S
, w R w0; and for w 2 S
;w0 62 S
, wRw0 but not w0Rw (this
is a matter of convention, considering that options outside
S

 are less relevant here).
With this extension, A 2 
;F(A) = M(A;R) still holds for any A 2 
.
Now we provide a necessary and sufficient condition ensuring the rationality of
a partial choice function: Let (A1;    ; Ai;    ; Ak) be a sequence of issues and the
circular permutation (i) = i+ 1; i = 1; : : : ; k   1 and (k) = 1:
Circular Consistency
If A(i) \ F(Ai) 6= ;; 1  i  k;
then A(i) \ F(Ai) = Ai \ F(A(i)); 1  i  k:
This Circular Consistency condition shows that if an issue and the outcomes of
the next issue are correlated circularly for k issues, then this correlation establishes
equivalent relations between issues and outcomes circularly.
We have the following result on two successive issues.
2 An alternative definition would be to say a partial choice function F is rational if and only
if it can be extended to a rational choice function over P(X) (i.e., there is a rational choice
function over P(X) that agrees with F on 
). These two definitions are equivalent.
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Lemma 1 Let 
 = fA;A0g, if the Circular Consistency condition holds, and A0 \
F(A) = A \ F(A0), then A0 \ F(A) = F(A) \ F(A0).
Fig. 3 illustrates Lemma 1. The two circles represent Ai and Ai+1, respectively.
The intersections of the rectangle with the two circles represent F(Ai) and F(Ai+1),
respectively, and the crossed section represents F(Ai) \ F(Ai+1). Now we give the
Fig. 3. Illustration of the two issue case
following representation theorem which shows that the above condition is necessary
and sufficient to ensure the partial choice function being rational.
Theorem 1 Let F be a partial choice function over 
, then F is rational if and only if
F satisfies the Circular Consistency condition.
Proof: The only if part is simple and we omit it here due to lack of space.
For the if part, assume that F satisfies the Circular Consistency condition.
We use graph theory to prove the existence of a total pre-order R. We view each
issue A 2 
 as a point. If F(Ai) \ F(Aj) 6= ;, then we connect points Ai and Aj
with an edge (no direction). LetG denote the formed graph. GraphG has several ( n)
connected components3, each of which contains a set of points (issues).
A simple fact that should be mentioned here is that for any two points Ai; Aj in
the same connected component, we could find a set of points fAt1 ;    ; Atmg such that
At1 = Ai; Atm = Aj and for any ts; ts+1, F(Ats) \ F(Ats+1) 6= ;. That is, there
is a path between points Ai and Aj , which is ensured by the connectiveness of the
connected component.
Now we view each connected component as a node. For two pointsAi; Aj in differ-
ent nodes X;Y , respectively, if F(Ai) \ Aj 6= ;, then we create a directed edge from
3 In graph theory [4], a connected component of an undirected graph is a subgraph in which any
two vertices are connected to each other by paths, and which (the subgraph) is connected to
no additional vertices. A directed connected component of a directed graph is a subgraph in
which any two vertices are connected to each other by a direct path, and which is connected to
no additional vertices.
Graph G has n connected components only when all Ais are pairwise disjoint. In all other
cases, G has less than n connected components. Here notice that the connected components,
when viewed as a set of Ais (its points), are a partition of 
.
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X to Y . If there are multiple directed edges from X to Y , we compress them as one
edge. This forms a new graph G0.
Here we should point out an important fact: G0 has no directed cycles. Otherwise
suppose G0 has a cycle X1 ! X2 !    ! Xk ! X1. Without loss of general-
ity, let points Ai1 ; Ai2 be contained in Xi (1  i  k) and F(A(i 1)2 \ Ai1 6= ;,
F(Ai2) \ A(i+1)1 6= ; hold (when i = k, i + 1 is changed to 1; when i = 1,
i   1 is changed to k). As mentioned earlier, points i1 and i2 in connected com-
ponent Xi can also be connected by a path fAt1 = Ai1 ;    ; Atmi = Ai2g such
that F(Ats) \ Ats+1 6= ; (Actually it is F(Ats) \ F(Ats+1) 6= ;. However, clearly
F(Ats) \ F(Ats+1) 6= ; implies F(Ats) \Ats+1 6= ;), 1  s < mi. Hence finally we
get a cycle fAi1 ;    ; Ai2 ; A(i+1)1 ;    ; A(i+1)2 ;    ; A(i 1)2 ; Ai1g. For any two adja-
cent pointsAl; Al0 in that cycle, we always haveF(Al)\Al0 6= ;. By the Circular Con-
sistency condition and Lemma 1, we getF(A(i 1)2)\F(Ai1) = F(A(i 1)2)\Ai1 6= ;.
That is, points A(i 1)2 and Ai1 should be in the same node, which creates a contradic-
tion since they are in different nodes Xi 1 and Xi, respectively.
Since G0 has no directed cycles, each of its directed connected component is a con-
nected directed acyclic graph (DAG). For each of such DAGH with nodes Y1;    ; Yk 2
H , we establish a mapping fH : H ! N associating each node with a natural number.
To do this, first we associate each node with a number indicating its maximal level.
– Any node with 0 in-degree4 is assigned level 0.
– Iteratively, a node is assigned with level k if each of its parent nodes is assigned
with a level value such that the maximal value among these is k   15.
With the concept of level of node, we define fH as follows.
– Any node with 0 in-degree (level 0) is assigned 1.
– Iteratively (by increasing the level value by 1 each time), for any node Z with s
in-degree and hence has s directed in-edges, Z1 ! Z,   , Zs ! Z, fH(Z) =Ps
i=1 fH(Zi) + s.
This construction ensures that if a directed edge Z 0 ! Z exists, then fH(Z 0) < fH(Z).
Now we establish a mapping f : G ! N such that for any point Ai in tree H (in
fact in a node Yt of H), f(Ai) = fH(Yt). Obviously we can see that any two points in
the same sub-graph of G (hence in the same node) have the same f value.
Finally we establish a mapping g :
S

 ! N [ f0g as follows.
If w 2 F(Ai), then g(w) = f(Ai). If w 62
S
Ai2
 F(Ai), then g(w) = 0.
Here we need to clarify that g is a valid mapping. That is, we must show if w 2
F(Ai) \ F(Aj), then f(Ai) = f(Aj). In fact, if F(Ai) \ F(Aj) 6= ;, then points Ai
and Aj are in the same connected component of G, and hence f(Ai) = f(Aj).
We defineR as:wRw0 if and only if g(w)  g(w0). It remains to show 8i,F(Ai) =
M(Ai; R).
By the definition of g, we know that if w;w0 2 F(Ai), then g(w) = g(w0). Now it
is sufficient to show that if w 2 F(Ai) and w0 2 Ai n F(Ai), then g(w) > g(w0).
4 The number of directed edges pointing to a node is called the in-degree of the node.
5 Here we can prove that the level of a node is the maximal length of any path from some 0
in-degree node to this node. However, this result is not essential in our proof so we omit it
here.
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If w0 62 SAi2
 F(Ai), then g(w)  1 > 0 = g(w0).
Else suppose w0 is in some F(Aj) (hence w0 2 Ai\F(Aj)), then F(Aj)\Ai 6= ;.
IfF(Aj\F(Ai) 6= ;, then according to Lemma 1, we haveF(Aj)\F(Ai) = F(Aj)\
Ai, hence w0 2 F(Ai) \ F(Aj) which contradicts with w0 62 F(Ai).
Therefore, we should haveF(Aj)\F(Ai) = ;, which implies that pointsAj andAi
are not in the same connected component of G, otherwise F(Aj)\F(Ai) = F(Aj)\
Ai 6= ;. Now we can conclude that in graph G0, there is a directed edge from the node
containing point Aj to the node containing point Ai. Therefore, by the definition of
fH and f , we know f(Ai) > f(Aj). Hence g(w) = f(Ai) > f(Aj) = g(w0). This
completes the proof. 2
Note that this proof also shows how to construct such a pre-order R by which F is
rationalized.
Fig. 4 illustrates the above theorem where each solid circle represents an Ai. The
intersection of a solid circle (representing Ai) with the dashed red ring in the center
represents F(Ai). Note that Fig. 4 just shows a sequence of issues that satisfy the
Fig. 4. Illustration of the k Issue Case
Circular Consistency condition. However, there could be multiple sequences (not nec-
essarily disjoint), each of which satisfies the Circular Consistency condition. So Fig. 4
is not necessarily a complete view for all sets A1;    ; An.
From Fig. 4, we can also see that 8x 2 F(Ai); y 2 F(Aj); 1  i; j  k, we have
x R y (as elements in the dashed red ring have the same plausibility). Note that for
z 2 F(Am);m > k, we do not necessarily have x R z.
4 Related Work
Classical works proved that a choice function F is rational if and only if it satisfies the
following condition [20, 23]:
Sen for all B 2 P(X) and all a 2 B, a 2 F(B) if and only if 8b 2 B; a 2 F(fa; bg).
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As a corollary, when a partial choice function turns into a choice function, our Cir-
cular Consistency condition implies condition Sen.
Corollary 1 Let F be a choice function, then if it satisfies Circular Consistency, it
satisfies Sen.
Also, in [9], Chernoff introduced a necessary condition for a choice function to be
rational:
Chernoff for all B;B0 2 P(X), if B  B0, then F(B0) \B  F(B).
Again, when a partial choice function turns into a choice function, our Circular
Consistency condition also induces condition Chernoff.
Corollary 2 Let F be a choice function, then if it satisfies Circular Consistency, it
satisfies Chernoff.
A lot of choice function conditions are reviewed in [18, 17, 22] relating choice func-
tion theory to AGM theory and nonmonotonic reasoning. It can be shown that most of
these conditions are derivable from our Circular Consistency condition. Since most of
these conditions are straightforward to understand and also due to space limitation, here
we omit most of them and only present the well-known Chernoff and Sen conditions.
Interested readers can refer to [18] for details.
Now we first explore relationships between our approach to the well-known AGM
framework. Let K be a consistent belief set representing the agent’s initial beliefs. K
is represented as a set of formulas. Let BK be a mapping from K to any subset of
formulas. The AGM axioms are listed as follows:
AGM1 BK() = [BK()]PL where for any set of formulas S, [S]PL is defined as the
PL-deductive closure of S in the usual way.
AGM2  2 BK().
AGM3 BK()  [K [ fg]PL.
AGM4 If : 62 K, then [K [ fg]PL  BK().
AGM5 BK() = 0 if and only if  is a contradictory, where 0 is the set of formulas
of the propositional language.
AGM6 If $  is a tautology, then BK() = BK( ).
AGM7 BK( ^  )  [BK() [ fg]PL.
AGM8 If : 62 BK(), then [BK() [ fg]PL  BK( ^  ).
Note that the Chernoff condition is very similar to the above AGM7 and AGM8 ax-
ioms6. It is easy to see that BK is a choice function at the semantic level. That is,
Mod(BK())  Mod() for any . For simplicity, by abuse of notation, we write
BK(Mod()) Mod() (here notation BK is taken as a mapping from a set of mod-
els to another set of models). Now, let B = Mod( ^); B0 = Mod() and F = BK ,
6 The similarity between Chernoff and AGM7, AGM8 axioms can be shown more clearly if we
define B0K() =
V
 2BK()  , and hence AGM7 and AGM8 axioms are translated as:
AGM7’ B0K() ^  j= B0K( ^ ).
AGM8’ If B0K() 6j= : , then B0K( ^ ) j= B0K() ^  .
8
then B  B0, and hence we obtain BK(B0) \ B  BK(B) which is equivalent to
BK() ^  j= BK( ^ ).
A general condition called Arrow’s condition [2] that generalizes both Sen and
Chernoff says: if B  B0, and F(B0) \ B 6= ;, then F(B) = F(B0) \ B. Indeed, if
some of the best in B0, belong to its subset B, none of the other elements in B can be a
best element in B (they are dominated inside B0). This is closely connected to Axiom
8 in the AGM framework.
In [6], the correspondence between AGM revision and rational choice functions is
studied. It shows that a choice frame7 is rational if and only if it is AGM-consistent,
where AGM-consistent is defined as: for every interpretation8 of the choice frame, the
associated partial belief revision function can be extended to a full-domain belief revi-
sion function that satisfies the AGM-postulates.
Let FORM(A) = f : Mod() 2 Ag be a set of formulas whose set of models
contain only elements of A. Note that FORM(A) is different from form(A). With
this notation, for a partial choice function, the associated partial belief revision function
is defined as follows.
Definition 2 Let F be a partial choice function such that F : 
 ! P(X), the associ-
ated belief revision function BF is a mapping BF : FORM(
) ! FORM(P(X))
such that BF () = F(Mod()).
A full-domain belief revision function B : FORM(P(X)) ! FORM(P(X)) is
called an extension of a partial belief revision function BF if for any  2 FORM(
),
B() = BF ().
We can also define a partial choice function is AGM-consistent if its associated
partial belief revision function can be extended to a full-domain belief revision function
that satisfies the AGM-postulates.
Now we have the following corollary.
Corollary 3 Let F be a partial choice function, then it satisfies Circular Consistency
if and only if it is AGM-consistent.
This Corollary suggests that there is an unearthed relationship between the Circular
Consistency condition and the AGM postulates. We will leave this topic in future work.
Remarks: Although condition Chernoff looks similar to a Monotonicity property,
Monotonicity does not hold for rational partial choice functions in general.
Mon If A1  A2, then F(A1)  F(A2).
Example 1 LetA1 = fw1; w2g,A2 = fw1; w2; w3g,F(A1) = fw1; w2g, andF(A2) =
fw3g. We could see that F is a partial choice function over 
 = fA1; A2g and it is
rational in terms of a pre-order  such that w3  w1 ' w2, i.e., we indeed have
F(A1) = M(A1;) and F(A2) = M(A2;). But it does not satisfy the Monotonicity
property. That is, we have A1  A2, but we do not have F(A1)  F(A2).
7 In [6], a choice frame consists of a set of alternativesX , a collection 
 of subsets ofX , and a
partial choice function F : 
 ! P(X).
8 In [6], an interpretation of a choice frame is obtained by adding a valuation V that assigns to
every atom p the subset of X at which p is true, and it is extended to formulas in the usual
way. This is a standard definition of an interpretation.
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5 Converse Belief Revision Problem
As mentioned in Introduction, our result can be applied to the converse belief revision
problem. Here we provide two necessary and sufficient conditions such that if a set of
revision scenarios satisfy these two conditions, then there must be a consistent belief
structure in the agent’s mind, and vice versa.
To proceed, first, let us formalize the definition of a revision scenario.
Definition 3 (Revision scenario) A revision scenario, denoted as rs = (; ), is a pair
of formulae  and , where  represents a new piece of evidence and  represents the
revision result upon receiving .
Below, we simply call a revision scenario a scenario.
Now we propose two conditions, i.e., Success and Circular Consistency conditions.
Let rsi = (i; i); 1  i  n be n distinct revision scenarios.
Success For any rsi = (i; i), i j= i, 1  i  n.
Explanation: This is a variant of the well-known success postulate in the AGM
framework. The revision result should respect the evidence.
Circular Consistency Let f(1; 1);    ; (k; k)g be any set of revision scenarios
(i.e., a subset of the set of all rsis) such that k  n, and let  be a circular permu-
tation such that (i) = i+ 1; i = 1 : : : k; (k) = 1. Then
If (i) ^ i 6j= ?; 1  i  k;
Then (i) ^ i  i ^ (i); 1  i  k:
As a corollary of Theorem 1, the following representation theorem shows that the
above two conditions are necessary and sufficient to ensure that an agent has a consistent
belief structure.
Corollary 4 Let RS be a set of scenarios, then there exists a belief structure, repre-
sented by a total pre-order overW , s.t., 8rs = (; ) 2 RS ,  = min(Mod();)
if and only if scenarios inRS satisfy Success and Circular Consistency.
Example 2 Suppose a hacking action was discovered originating from one of the PCs
in an office. The log file shows that the action was conducted between 4pm to 5pm. A
suspect Y declared that he left the office between 4pm and 5pm and he did not log on
to any computer before he left. A witness suggested that Y was seen doing something
with that particular computer at that time. Now if suspect Y explains:
Viewing web pages: Y was viewing web pages, OR
Cleaning the monitor: Y was cleaning the equipment.
Does Y have a consistent belief structure with each one of these two explanations? The
answer to the above question is important. Certainly, we cannot say Y is innocent if
Y does have a consistent belief structure, as it only shows that Y ’s statements are co-
herent. However, Y should be considered highly suspiciously if he fails to demonstrate
consistency in its response to questions/evidence.
10
Here suppose a system security engineer has two pieces of evidence: there was
a hacking action during 4pm to 5pm and Y was seen using the PC at the time. Y ’s
reactions to the two pieces of evidence may allow the security engineer spotting an in-
consistency between the statements, or equivalently, establishing whether Y is applying
a consistent belief structure when responding to the two inputs.
Let 1 be ‘a hacking action was discovered from 4pm to 5pm’,  1 be ‘Y did not
log on to any computer in the office’. Then 1 = 1 ^  1 is Y ’s revision result upon
receiving 1, meaning that “although there was a hacking action, it is not me (i.e., Y )
since I did not log on to any computer”. Let 2 be ‘Y was seen doing something with the
PC at that time’. To consider possible revision results for the two situations described
above, let 2 be ‘Y was viewing web pages’, and 02 be ‘Y was cleaning the monitor’.
Here we should note that 1 ^ 2  ? since if Y was viewing web pages, then Y must
have logged on to the PC, conflicting with Y ’s claim not logging on to any computers in
the office. In this situation, as we only focus on two possibilities: ‘Y was viewing web
pages’ and ‘Y was cleaning the monitor’, for simplicity we can assume that these two
are exclusive and exhaustive. Hence it is easy to see that ‘Y was cleaning the monitor’
indicates ‘Y did not log on to the PC’ and ‘Y was viewing web pages’ indicates ‘Y
had logged on to the PC’, therefore we have 2 = 2 ^ : 1 and 02 = 2 ^  1.
Now to justify whether Y has a consistent belief structure, we check the two postu-
lates.
Success Obviously we have 1 j= 1, 2 j= 2, and 02 j= 2.
Circular Consistency For the two revision results 2 and 02,
– we have 1^2 6j= ? and 2^1 6j= ?, but we do not have 1^2  2^1,
– we have 1 ^ 02 6j= ? and 2 ^ 1 6j= ?, and we have 1 ^ 02  2 ^ 1.
Therefore, by Corollary 4, we obtain the following conclusions:
– If the revision result by Y is ‘Y was viewing web pages’, then Y does not have a
consistent belief structure, and hence Y is highly suspect.
– If the revision result by Y (his explanation) is ‘Y was cleaning the monitor, then Y
has a consistent belief structure, and hence Y might be innocent.
These conclusions are in line with our intuition. In the second case, a belief structure
for Y is: : f1 ^  1  1 ^ : 1 ' 2 ^  1  2 ^ : 1g. Here note that there
are both models for  1 and models for : 1 appearing in Y ’s belief structure. This is
because it is an inferred belief structure from the current information. Y ’s actual belief
structure could be more elaborated, but should be consistent with the inferred belief
structure.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we proved a necessary and sufficient condition, i.e., Circular Consistency,
for a partial choice function to be rational. Also, we have demonstrated that this solution
can be used to construct a consistent belief structure for an agent from a set of revision
scenarios.In addition, by comparing with related works, we proved that when a partial
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choice function turns into a choice function, our Circular Consistency condition can
recover the necessary and sufficient conditions proposed before.
In terms of belief revision, our study hinted why lying could be a hard thing to
do: one always needs to keep a track of what had been said to maintain consistency
between different scenarios. This commonsense is widely acknowledged, and it is again
partially proved in this paper in the belief revision scenario. Our study also provided
some insights about belief revision in general.
As future work, one attempt is to investigate whether there are simpler conditions
that can be used to replace the Circular Consistency condition, especially on whether
the Circular Consistency condition can be decomposed into some AGM-like or Sen,
Chernoff-like conditions. In addition, there is a notion called sub-rationality intro-
duced by Deb [11] such that a choice function F is sub-rational if for some order R,
M(A;R)  F(A) holds for all A 2 P(X). It is interesting to study the necessary and
sufficient conditions for sub-rational partial choice functions.
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